ROLE AND POWERS OF THE NON-EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA: UNFINISHED CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION FROM A SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE TO THE ARMENIAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY

Abstract

With the constitutional change of 2015, Armenia made an
uncomplete transition from the semi-presidential system of
governance to parliamentary democracy. Within the first chapter,
this article presents the constitutional role, functions of the
President of Armenia, and the powers vested in the President in
accordance with the constitutional architecture that has been in
place since 2015. The adequacy of constitutional status attributed
to the President as well as the scope of the powers and duties are
assessed given the formation of the Government, election and
resignation of the Prime Minister, applicable electoral system,
applicable regime of the dissolution of the Parliament, formation
of autonomous bodies stipulated by the Constitution (Central
Bank, Central Electoral Commission etc.), the given solutions in
deadlock situations when the political majority is not able to
secure 3/5th of the votes and elect a member of the politically
neutral body, the powers given to the parliamentary minority,
and the quality of the political discourse. The second chapter
discusses what are the main expectations from the President’s
office, what is the aim of establishing a non-executive president
based on the nature of the Armenian parliamentary democracy
and adopted constitutional architecture? Considering the models set out in the guidelines provided by the International IDEA as
well as based on the legal comparative research, the second
chapter suggests what discretionary powers should be given to
the President so that he or she can act as constitutional arbiter
but meanwhile prevented from becoming a player in the political
game.